This bibliography consists of 936 numbered entries, with references to a far greater number of works. The first part covers works by Malebranche and consists of six sections on his collected works, selections from his works, his individual works, translations of his works, his correspondence, and the controversies into which he entered. The second part deals with works on Malebranche and consists of other bibliographical sources, biographical references, and studies. As a critical bibliography, this book contains not only references to (...) reviews but also a brief critical assessment for most entries. An extensive index is included and much of the material is cross-referenced. Entries note when a work has been superseded and refer the reader to the more recent work. (shrink)

How does microbiota research impact our understanding of biological individuality? We summarize the interdisciplinary summer school on "Microbiota, Symbiosis and Individuality: Conceptual and Philosophical Issues" (July 2019), which was supported by a European Research Council starting grant project "Immunity, DEvelopment, and the Microbiota" (IDEM). The summer school centered around interdisciplinary group work on four facets of microbiota research: holobionts, individuality, causation, and human health. The conceptual discussion of cutting-edge empirical research provided new insights into microbiota and highlights the value of (...) incorporating into meetings experts from other disciplines, such as philosophy and history of science. (shrink)

Physicalism is a metaphysical thesis easily presented in slogan form – there is nothing over and above the physical – but notoriously difficult to formulate precisely. "Understanding physicalism" combines insights from contemporary philosophy of mind and metaphysics to present a new account of physical properties and metaphysical dependence and, on this foundation, develop a more rigorous and illuminating formulation of the thesis of physicalism.

I present a novel anti-sceptical BIV argument by focusing on conditions on the production and use of the locative preposition ‘in’. I distinguish two uses of ‘in’—material and descriptive phenomenological—and I explain in what respect movement is central to the concept that our use of ‘in’ expresses. I go on to argue that a functionalist semantics of the intelligible use of ‘in’ demands a materialist philosophy of action in the spirit of G.E.M. Anscombe, but also why the structure of space (...) is not irrelevant either; appeal to the structure of space unsettles the causal-empirical assumptions that ground the picture of subjectivity and agency that the biv narrative assumes. Finally, I explain why a functionalist semantics demands a Naïve Realist metaphysics of perception, consistent with some of Putnam’s last writings on philosophy of perception. (shrink)

With contributions by John J. Cleary, Gregor Damschen, Rainer Enskat, Francisco J. Gonzalez, Jürgen Mittelstraß and Carlo Natali (all on Plato) as well as by Enrico Berti, Nicolas Braun, Graciela M. Chichi, Wolfgang Kullmann, Helmut Mai, Alejandro G. Vigo, Franco Volpi and Hermann Weidemann (all on Aristotle).

Om ett värdeobjektivistiskt inslag i Hägerströms moralfilosofiska teorier.--Till försvar för Zenon från Elea.--Den speciella relativitetsteoriens förhållande til de newtonianska föreställningarna om rum och tid.

Based on the theory of dialectical structures, I review the concept of degree of justification of a partial position a proponent may hold in a controversial debate. The formal concept of degree of justification dovetails with our pre-theoretic intuitions about a thesis' strength of justification. The central claim I'm going to defend in this paper maintains that degrees of justification, as defined within the theory of dialectical structures, correlate with a proponent position's verisimilitude. I vindicate this thesis with the results (...) of simulations of controversial argumentation. (shrink)

I ask whether figure-ground structure can be realized in touch, and, if so, how. Drawing on the taxonomy of touch sketched in Katz's 1925 The World of Touch, I argue that the form of touch that is relevant to such consideration is a species of immersed touch. I consider whether we can feel the space we are immersed in and, more specifically, the empty space against which the surfaces of objects, as I shall urge, “stand out.” Harnessing M. G. F. (...) Martin's account of bodily awareness and touch, I defend a positive thesis, pace Graham Nerlich on whose The Shape of Space I otherwise rely, both to defend the supposition that empty space can in principle be felt and to argue that touching empty space is not a mere species of absence perception. Along the way, I defuse a causal worry that might be thought to arise in the case of touching empty space. (shrink)

I introduce a perceptual phenomenon so far overlooked in the philosophical literature: ‘visual evanescence’. ‘Evanescent’ objects are those that due to their structured visible appearances have a tendency to vanish or evanesce from sight at certain places and for certain ‘biologically apt’ perceivers. Paradigmatically evanescent objects are those associated with certain forms of animal camouflage. I show that reflection on visual evanescence helps create conceptual room for a treatment of looks statements not explicit in the contemporary literature, one which takes (...) its cue from the relatively neglected philosophy of perception of G.E.M. Anscombe. In sensory contexts in which evanescence is known to have occurred, the use of ‘looks invisible’ seems to be intelligible, a fact that sensationalist and objectivist treatments of the nature of looks, as I call them, cannot obviously accommodate - at least, as I explain, when coupled with what Cora Diamond (1981) describes as a ‘natural’ understanding of nonsense. Focusing on a number of imaginative scenarios in which the statement ‘looks invisible’ is permissible, I oppose these ontological treatments with the grammatical approach I draw from Anscombe and in doing so I uncover a degree of unity across the cases I consider: something can intelligibly be said to ‘look invisible’ if one can see or appears to see the entirety of the region that the ‘invisible’ thing occupies. The region ‘looks empty’ but is full. (shrink)

I consider the first part of Marty’s Raum und Zeit, which treats of both the nature of space and spatial perception. I begin by sketching two charges that Marty raises against Kantian and Brentanian conceptions of space (and spatial perception) respectively, before detailing what I take to be a characteristically Martyan picture of space perception, though set against the backdrop of contemporary philosophy of perception. Marty has it that spatial relations are non-real but existent, causally inert relations that are grounded (...) in space, which is itself non-real but existent. Objects do not inhere in space in the way properties inhere in substances. Rather, there is a ‘non-real’ relation of ‘fulfillment’ (Erfüllung) that holds between objects and places in space, which itself subsists. I consider whether any contemporary philosophy of perception is equipped to make sense of Martyan space perception and I suggest that the most promising conception is Naïve Realism. I then outline a difficulty for this theoretical translation. Naïve Realism is a direct theory of perception whereby S is said to perceive O just in case S stands in a psychological relation of acquaintance with O, where this relation is both non-representational and explanatorily primitive. For Marty however, all relations are non-real and, insofar as they are grounded, are neither fundamental, nor brute or primitive in an explanatory sense. I close by detailing what I thereby take a distinctively Martyan form of Naïve Realism to involve. The central theoretical tenet that phenomenal character is fundamentally constituted by worldly objects is preserved; but the manifestly relational structure of the acquaintance relation, construed in particular as a relation of awareness, is treated as derivative. I make headway in spelling out the latter claim by bringing Marty into fleeting conversation with another Thomist - G.E.M. Anscombe. (shrink)

In his reference letter for Murdoch’s 1947 fellowship application at Newnham College, Cambridge, her erstwhile Oxford undergraduate tutor, Donald MacKinnon, remarks that Murdoch is ‘on the threshold of creative work of a high order’. This chapter outlines the nature of that ‘creative work’ and its early development. We show how Murdoch’s close study of the Christian existentialist philosopher and playwright Gabriel Marcel (1883–1973) came to inflect both her early critique of Jean Paul Sartre’s existentialism and her first attempts to show (...) the limits of logical positivism. We explain how once at Cambridge, Murdoch’s exposure to Wittgenstein’s method, through her philosophical friendship with Elizabeth Anscombe, gave her the conceptual means to recast those aspects of Marcel’s thought (as well as those of Martin Buber) that she believed were important but, as she wrote in her application, ‘vague’. We show, finally, how both strands of Murdoch’s thinking are later brought into synchrony in the much-discussed example of M&D. This, in turn, allows us to isolate Murdoch’s understanding of the individual’s relation to their own ‘ghostly past’ and to reveal the importance of Murdoch’s early encounters with Anscombe and Marcel. (shrink)

ObjectiveTo determine to what extent physical fitness indicators and/or moderate to vigorous physical activity may account for final mathematics academic performance awarded at the end of primary school.MethodsSchool-aged youth were sampled in a repeated-measures, longitudinal design in Grade 6, and again in Grade 9. The youth completed a fitness test battery consisting of: flamingo balance test, standing long jump, backward obstacle course, plate tapping, sit ups, sit and reach, handgrip, and 20-m shuttle run. APmath scores were obtained for all children (...) at the end of Grade 5, end of Grade 8, and end of Grade 9. In a sub-sample of Grade 6 youth, MVPA was measured objectively via SenseWear Pro Armbands for seven consecutive days, with measurements repeated in Grade 9.ResultsMath scores decreased from Grade 6 to 9 for both boys and girls. MVPAOB was reduced by ∼45.7 min from Grade 6 to 9. Significant main and interaction effects are noted for each fitness indicator. A backward stepwise multiple regression analysis determined significant shared variance in final APmath grade to the change scores from Grade 6 to Grade 9 in: ΔAPmath, Δbackward obstacle course, Δsit and reach, and Δsit-ups [R2 = 0.494, F = 43.67, p < 0.0001]. A second regression was performed only for the youth who completed MVPAOB measurements. In this sub-sample, MVPAOB did not significantly contribute to the model.ConclusionLongitudinal changes in youth fitness and their delta change in APmath score accounted for 49.4% of the variance in the final math grade awarded at the end of Grade 9. Aerobic power, upper body strength, and muscular endurance share more common variance to final math grade in boys, whereas whole-body coordination was the more relevant index in girls; this finding suggests that future research exploring the relationship of AP and PF should not be limited to cardiorespiratory fitness, instead encompassing muscular and neuro-muscular components of PF. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 231 that neither Borro nor any of the Aristotelian writers on method mentioned by Randall seems to me to have influenced Galileo. If I were to begin looking for Aristotelian influences, I should think it much more promising to examine carefully those discussions on the relation between "most powerful demonstrations" and the proofs of mathematics carried on at Padua and elsewhere, to which I have already (...) referred. But I should expect even this investigation to produce nothing, for it seems to me that we already have at hand all the materials needed to explain Galileo's remarks on method when we have assembled Euclid, Archimedes, and Pappus. NEAL W. GILBERT University ol CaliIornia, Davis A "Nsw" DESCARTESEDITION?* Few definitive editions of a great philosopher's works have been more successful and influential than the Descartes edition which Charles Adam and Paul Tannery launched in 1896 and which Adam completed alone in 1913, long after the death of his collaborator and friend. The prestige of AT (as the edition is commonly called) is such that its texts in practice supersede even the originals? But this monument to French scholarship is now half a century old--almost seventy years old if we consider the date of the first volume. AT has always been a difficult edition to work with. Texts and comments that belong together are not infrequently scattered through its twelve massive volumes and the Supplement (AT XIII), chiefly because the launching of this edition stimulated a new search and resulted in the finding of documents and in critical work that had to be incorporated as the edition went along. Although what is now known as the Entretien avec Burman had already been discovered when AT got under way, the user will find no reference to it in the tables of contents or even in the list of Descartes' works in AT XIII. It is buried in AT V among the correspondence, and only Adam's own separate edition of it, with his French translation of the original [86], has assured this remarkable document of the wide readership it deserves. By now, AT is also woefully incomplete; important new material has been found since 1913, notably the bulk of Descartes' correspondence with Constantijn Huygens, and the Ballet for Queen Christina * (Editor's note. In view of the importance of both the project to bring out a new edition of the works of Descartes, and of preparing editions of the works of other major philosophers, it is hoped that Professor Sebba's discussion of some of the problems involved will prove helpful in stimulating further interest in these matters.) 1 See my Bibliographia cartesiana: A Critical Guide to the Descartes Literature, 1800-1960 (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, in press), to which numbers in square brackets in this paper refer. For a list and brief discussion of the most useful current editions see [74-92b] in this bibliography. 232 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY of Sweden. Let us also recall the tremendous progress made in editing seventeenth-century texts, especially as regards the necessary explanations. Compared to some of these new editions, the corresponding parts of AT look like a painter's canvas with mere outlines, the details still to be filled in. No wonder that the need for a new definitive Descartes edition has been obvious for some time? This is why the project of a revision of AT, now under way under the auspices of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, deserves careful scrutiny. The needs for a new edition transcend the field of Descartes studies proper. There has been an upsurge in seventeenthcentury studies in general, which is beginning to yield unexpected results in several ways. A great deal of new source material has been found; new critical work is being devoted to major and lesser Cartesians and antiCartesians ; as a result, some reassessments of historical development and doctrinal relationships seem to be in the making? Work on the proposed revision of AT has been entrusted to a group of out2In 1960 I said that "the most pressing desideratum [in Descartes research] is undoubtedly a new edition of the works of Descartes, although the great Adam-Tannery edition... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:82 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY phy) than the aspects considered in the earlier chapters. The attempts of these men to formulate theories of the cosmos and of natural phenomena, to take the place of Aristotle's natural philosophy, are described as honest and original speculative endeavors, with a few features which can be construed as anticipations of seventeenth-century scientific philosophy, but basically lacking the soundness of method and evidence that could (...) make them adequate substitutes for the Aristotelian system. "The Aristotelian tradition of natural philosophy," as Kristeller states, "was not overthrown by the outside attacks of the humanists or Platonists, nor by the suggestive theories of the natural philosophers. It yielded only in and after the seven~ teenth century, when the new science of Galileo and his successors was able to deal with its subject matter on the basis of a firmly established and superior method" (p. 96). All of the essays in this book are distinguished by their concern for historical truth and objectivity, by their attempt to present the thought of the eight authors in the context of the times and in terms of the interests and purposes of the writers themselves, and by the rich and enlightened perspectives of historical understanding brought to bear on the subjects discussed. But what is most attractive, and indeed striking, in this work of Kristeller, as in the other books and essays he has written on Renaissance thought, is his own conviction that the cultural and philosophical ideals which characterized the Italian Renaissance are of intrinsic and enduring value in their own right.Unlike many other expositers and partisans of Renaissance thought, who extol it because it anticipated modem science, or because it was secularist,or anti-scholastic, or "this-worldly"rather than "other-worldly", Kristeller admires it for just what it was. And to those who define philosophy as logical analysis, or as existentialism,or as pragmatism or neo=seholasticism, and on that basis claim that the Italian Renaissance made no contribution to philosophy, Kristeliermakes no apologies. There is no necessary repugnance between scholarship and philosophy, or between original thought and an understanding and appreciation of the classics,nor is cultural barbarism a necessary prerequisite of the pursuit of truth. The values which Kristellerdefends in our time are very much those which Erasmus defended in the sixteenth century. "There is such a thing as the autonomy of culture," Kristeller remarks (p. 94), "and it has always been the task and duty of scholars to defend this territory against the deeper inroads of religious and politicalinfluences." The inroads in our time have been made by differentfanaticisms than those of the sixteenth century, but the defense of the integrity of scholarship and of liberal culture has been a task and duty to which Paul Kristeller has been faithful throughout his long and fruitfulcareer. ER~S~ A. MooDY University of California, Los Angeles Ren$ Descartes: Regulae ad direct~onem ingenii. Texte critique ~tabli par Giovanni Crapulli, avec la version hollandaise du XVH ~m~ si~ele. (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. -" Archives Intemationales d'histeire des iddes, t. 12. Pp. xxxiii + 80 + 80* + 40. Guilders 38.75.) This edition of the Regulae is important because for the first time since the great AdamTannery edition of 1896--1913 a major work of Descartes has been independently re-edited from the sources according to the most advanced editorial principles. The historian of philosophy -the user--will ask four questions: (1) Why a new edition? (2) What does it offer? (3) How does it affect the AT text? (4) What edition should be used and cited? Here briefly, are the answers as one user sees them. 1. The Regulae were posthumously published in 1701. Besides this edito princeps (A) there exists the so-called Hanover manuscript (H) with emendations by Leibniz (L). These were kdam's sources. But the Regulae became known first through the Dutch translation of Glazemaker, published in 1684 (N) which Adam knew but did not use. This led Dr. Crapulli to a review of the whole editorial problem. He concluded that A, H and N were prepared from BOOK REVIEWS 83 three different manuscripts, none of them Descartes's original (which is lost... (shrink)

Ein kritischer Literaturbericht zu: Gernot Böhme, Die Natur vor uns. Naturphilosophie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. Kusterdingen : Die Graue Edition. 2002; M. Drieschner, Moderne Naturphilosophie. Eine Einführung. Paderborn : Mentis. 2002; M. Esfeld, Einführung in die Naturphilosophie. Darmstadt : Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 2002; T. S. Hoffmann, Philosophische Physiologie. Eine Systematik des Begriffs der Natur im Spiegel der Geschichte der Philosophie. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt : Frommann-Holzboog. 2003; R. Huber, Natur-Erkenntnis. Band 1. Naturphilosophie von der Antike bis Descartes. Paderborn : Mentis. 2002; K. Köchy, Perspektiven (...) des Organischen. Biophilosophie zwischen Natur- und Wissenschaftsphilosophie. Paderborn : Schöningh. 2003; H. D. Mutschler, Grundkurs Philosophie: Naturphilosophie [Band 12]. Stuttgart : Kohlhammer. 2002, in: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 58. Jg. (2004), S. 447-456. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:260 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Christian business" is not knowledge but experience. He founds religious certainty on individual inspiration and emphasizes charity against external written law. A man inspired by God becomes autonomous and acquires a mind of his own--independent of external authorities. This valuable study (pp. 5-109) is followed by an extensive bibliography (pp. 113--209) in which it could be added that Vald~s' Al[abeto Cristiano was reprinted in 1948 (...) by the Editorial "La Aurora" of Buenos Aires. In 1946 this publisher considered (in the Preface to his reprint of Vald~s' Dicilogo de Doctrina Cristiana, p. 12) republishing also Vald6s' Ciento y diez consideraciones divinas. PAUL T. FUrIRMAN~ Columbia Theological Seminary Descartes. Oeuvres philosophiques. Tome I (1618-1637.) Textes 6tablis, pr6sent6s et annot6s par Ferdinand Alqui6. l~dition illustr6e. (Paris: Garnier Fr6res, 1965. [Glassiques Garnier.] Pp. 829 + 12 plates.) The publication of this massive paperbound volume is an event in Descartes studies. It is the first in a three-volume edition of Descartes' complete philosophical works in French, an edition which is original in its plan, up-to-date in scholarship, worked from the sources, and superbly annotated, the only truly new edition since Charles Adam completed the great AT in 1913. Professor Alqui6 defines the word "philosophical" almost as broadly as Descartes did. To the specifically philosophical texts he adds generous portions of the non-mathematical scientific works. All Latin texts are given in French translation (the Meditations are to appear bilingually.) The spelling is modern. The AT pagination appears in the margin, but the volume number should be given there too. Scholars working with AT and AM (Adam-Milhaud's Correspondance de D.) should take note of the textual corrections and emendations in this Edition dlquid. In the battle of Descartes interpretation Professor Alqui6 takes the chronological stand. Where Martial Gueroult sees a marvellously wrought monolithic system, there Alqui6 sees development and growth: to understand Descartes one must follow his "itin6raire philosophique" step by step. In his new role as editor he practices what he preached. This is the first edition to take us in unbroken, rigorously chronological sequence from the first extant writing through the year of the Discours de la mdthode. Even the correspondence is broken up and inserted between the writings in its chronological place. (Just about half of Descartes' letters of this period--none written to him--are given:.58 as against 27 in the Pl6i'ade edition.) The volume opens with a few (too few) paragraphs from the Compendium Musicae of 1618 and sections from the Cogitationes privatae, including the complete text of Baillet's account of the Dream of Descartes. The Regulae appear in a new, annotated translation by Jacques Brunschvicg. Le Monde et le Traitd de l'Homme, treated as one manuscript, is here, all but complete. After the Discours de la mdthode we get the first six chapters of the Dioptrique and four of the ten chapters of Mdtdores. All omitted chapters are summarized. The little Traitd de la m~canique brings up the rear. The missing Gdom(trie is to appear in a companion volume of collected mathematical writings, promised for some later date. The reader who never read all of Descartes' writings between 1618 and 1637 in fl~eir chronological order will find a new vista opening up. This is particularly true of the sixty-odd pages of earliest writings. But here the editor's principle of excluding "mathematical " texts works against his clear intention of keeping interpretation out: "Une ~dition BOOK REVIEWS 261 de Descartes," he writes, "n'est pas une th~se sur la philosophie de Descartes." Alqui6 here (and only here) excludes not only all purely mathematical texts but also those on mechanics, optics, acoustics, hydraulics, automata, etc., and even epistemologically significant items like "hi omni questione debet dari aliquod medium," "Si funis," and the full text of the ars memoriae passage. The only exception is Descartes' answer to Beeckman's problem regarding free fall, truncated at the point where Descartes with the characteristic dlan of these years continues: "Ut autem hujus scientiae fundamenta jaciam...". AlquiCs general justification for the exclusion of "mathematics" rests upon the evidence that Descartes himself... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:82 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY phy) than the aspects considered in the earlier chapters. The attempts of these men to formulate theories of the cosmos and of natural phenomena, to take the place of Aristotle's natural philosophy, are described as honest and original speculative endeavors, with a few features which can be construed as anticipations of seventeenth-century scientific philosophy, but basically lacking the soundness of method and evidence that could (...) make them adequate substitutes for the Aristotelian system. "The Aristotelian tradition of natural philosophy," as Kristeller states, "was not overthrown by the outside attacks of the humanists or Platonists, nor by the suggestive theories of the natural philosophers. It yielded only in and after the seven~ teenth century, when the new science of Galileo and his successors was able to deal with its subject matter on the basis of a firmly established and superior method" (p. 96). All of the essays in this book are distinguished by their concern for historical truth and objectivity, by their attempt to present the thought of the eight authors in the context of the times and in terms of the interests and purposes of the writers themselves, and by the rich and enlightened perspectives of historical understanding brought to bear on the subjects discussed. But what is most attractive, and indeed striking, in this work of Kristeller, as in the other books and essays he has written on Renaissance thought, is his own conviction that the cultural and philosophical ideals which characterized the Italian Renaissance are of intrinsic and enduring value in their own right.Unlike many other expositers and partisans of Renaissance thought, who extol it because it anticipated modem science, or because it was secularist,or anti-scholastic, or "this-worldly"rather than "other-worldly", Kristeller admires it for just what it was. And to those who define philosophy as logical analysis, or as existentialism,or as pragmatism or neo=seholasticism, and on that basis claim that the Italian Renaissance made no contribution to philosophy, Kristeliermakes no apologies. There is no necessary repugnance between scholarship and philosophy, or between original thought and an understanding and appreciation of the classics,nor is cultural barbarism a necessary prerequisite of the pursuit of truth. The values which Kristellerdefends in our time are very much those which Erasmus defended in the sixteenth century. "There is such a thing as the autonomy of culture," Kristeller remarks (p. 94), "and it has always been the task and duty of scholars to defend this territory against the deeper inroads of religious and politicalinfluences." The inroads in our time have been made by differentfanaticisms than those of the sixteenth century, but the defense of the integrity of scholarship and of liberal culture has been a task and duty to which Paul Kristeller has been faithful throughout his long and fruitfulcareer. ER~S~ A. MooDY University of California, Los Angeles Ren$ Descartes: Regulae ad direct~onem ingenii. Texte critique ~tabli par Giovanni Crapulli, avec la version hollandaise du XVH ~m~ si~ele. (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. -" Archives Intemationales d'histeire des iddes, t. 12. Pp. xxxiii + 80 + 80* + 40. Guilders 38.75.) This edition of the Regulae is important because for the first time since the great AdamTannery edition of 1896--1913 a major work of Descartes has been independently re-edited from the sources according to the most advanced editorial principles. The historian of philosophy -the user--will ask four questions: (1) Why a new edition? (2) What does it offer? (3) How does it affect the AT text? (4) What edition should be used and cited? Here briefly, are the answers as one user sees them. 1. The Regulae were posthumously published in 1701. Besides this edito princeps (A) there exists the so-called Hanover manuscript (H) with emendations by Leibniz (L). These were kdam's sources. But the Regulae became known first through the Dutch translation of Glazemaker, published in 1684 (N) which Adam knew but did not use. This led Dr. Crapulli to a review of the whole editorial problem. He concluded that A, H and N were prepared from BOOK REVIEWS 83 three different manuscripts, none of them Descartes's original (which is lost... (shrink)